Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. 6 While a slender volume, The Fe deral Impeachment Process7 of fers the reader a variety of different insights on this topic, beginnin g with the debates at the Constitutional Convention and running to the modem-day practice of impeachment trials by committee rather than by the full senate. Impeachment is valuable reading, not just for those of us interested in American history, or those of us who are public officers of the United States, but for every American who wants to understand his or her morning newspaper better. Not only does it lift the veil of darkness surrounding the impeachment process, it provides a focus for the perceptions of all those who are concerned over the recent spate of impeachment threats.s
As Professor Gerhardt9 notes at the outset, impeachment was not a major consideration at the Constitutional Convention. The most prominent ratification document discussing the federal im peachment process -and, of course, a series of other issues -was The Fe deralist Pap ers (p. 12). The Fe deralist Pap ers provided an overview of the model replicated by the convention -and the model, it turns out, follows the impeachment procedures adopted by the most populous states. The model has an unmistakable theme often overlooked by some in Congress today, to say nothing of President Clinton: that impeachment is an appropriate remedy only where a public officer has committed a criminal act while in office. Furthermore, the view of the Framers was that removal from office and disqualification from holding future public office was to be the only punishment. This is quite different from the pat tern in England at the time, where not only were private citizens subject to impeachment, but criminal penalties could and would be imposed and by a bare majority of the House of Lords. Clearly the Framers sought a uniquely American variation of the impeachment process (pp. 4-5) .
Professor Gerhardt has a writing style that enables the reader to feel that he is sitting at a desk just behind the delegates, absorbing the debate. He describes in some detail each of the various plans that were put forth at the convention. Vol. 96:1598 While the plans differed in several ways, the wrongdoing that would constitute an impeachable offense was probably the most di verse and included, at one time or another, malpractice, neglect of duty, malversation and corruption before reaching, by an eight-to three vote, the language, "bribery and other high crimes and misde meanors." The author fails to note how treason crept into the final language. He does note, however that it was not until August 1789 that a report was published advocating that the House of Repre sentatives should have the sole power to impeach. Interestingly, even at that late date, the report went on to provide that the trial that followed impeachment by the House would occur before the Supreme Court. As it turned out, " [t] he delegates ultimately agreed that the Senate posed the fewest problems of the various proposed trial courts. When the full convention voted on the Sen ate as the trial body for impeachments, only Pennsylvania and Vir ginia dissented from the proposal to make the Senate the 'sole' court for impeachment trials" (p. 7). Perhaps most importantly for academics and certainly for history buffs, we learn from Impeach ment who was on each side of these significant issues and why.
WHO SHOULD BE IMPEACHED
One could not help but draw some parallels between the de bates at the Constitutional Convention as to the officeholders to be included in the impeachment orbit and the modem-day independ ent counsel statute. In that statute, some seventy souls were finally, and often after a painstaking review of hundreds of officeholders, included amongst those men and women from the Executive Branch subject to investigation by the special prosecutor. The Framers, on the other hand, chose to paint with a broader brush: they simply used the words "all civil Officers"1 0 -a phrase that has wrought some havoc in the latter part of the 20th Century, at least amongst constitutional scholars. We learn how this issue has been defined and redefined by interpretation and history over the last 200 years. Clearly, the language targets the Executive Branch and the Judicial Branch but, as Professor Gerhardt takes pains to note, not the Legislative Branch (p. 76).
One cannot help but wonder why or whether the Fr amers be lieved that oversight by the legislature was necessary to discipline the Chief Executive and his appointees, including the judiciary, but not the legislature itself. Perhaps the Senate thought, at least as to judges, that life tenure and the requirement that there be no dimi nution in compensation was of such importance as to require an other branch of government to look after them. Hamilton believed that these incidents of office alone would be sufficient to ensure judicial independence and the omnipresent prospect of impeach ment would not dampen that·independence (pp. 16-17). I wonder.
Yet Professor Gerhardt recounts how the impeachment of Senator Blount of Tennessee initiated by John Adams provided the back drop for a debate which culminated in the refusal of the Senate to include its members within the reach of the impeachment net. In stead, on July 8, 1797, the day after Senator Blount was impeached by the House, the Senate expelled the Senator by a vote of twenty five to one (p. 48). Ever since, the Senate has taken unto itself the role of meting out any necessary discipline among its members.
The book is in large measure devoted to the impeachment pro ceedings against the judiciary. The book chronicles at length almost every judge ever subject to articles of impeachment by the House, whether successful or not. In these chronicles, Gerhardt raises and provides historical perspective on other provocative questions. For instance, should it be fair gam� to indict and convict a federal judge for criminal activity before impeachment or should impeachment be the sole remedy by which to unseat ari Article III judge? Alex ander Hamilton was prominent in this debate at the Convention. His view, as expressed by Professor Gerhardt, was to the effect that:
The Constitution sets forth the grounds for impeaching the president in a different place from its provision that every impeachable official, including the president, is "liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgement, and Punishment, according to law." Yet, Hamilton read this text as providing that a president would first be impeached and removed from office and "would afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in the courts of law." Given that the constitutional convention delegates did not discuss the preferred order of impeach ment and legal actions and that the Constitution does not state in so many words that a president's liability at law should attach only after he has left office, Hamilton's re�ding seems to have assumed its conclusion.
The language of the Constitution raises a variety of other similar conundrums; another discussed at length by the author is the lan guage that seemingly calls for the Vice President to preside at all impeachment trials. If followed slavishly, it would, of course, leave him or her to preside over his own .or her_ own impeachment trial.
IMPEACHMENT FOR WHAT?.
For me, the most interesting theme throughout the volume is the in-depth study of what "high crimes and misdemeanors" means and how that meaning has changed froin the days of our country's Fo unders. The change is highlighted by the background wrongs for which those impeached, primarily judges, have been charged. When all is said and done, one comes to the frightening realization [Vol. 96:1598 that then-Representative Gerald Fo rd's remark that an impeach ment offense is "whatever a majority of the House [considers it] to be at a given moment in history," may hit the mark (p. 103). While many may have believed, as the Framers did, that "high crimes and misdemeanors" meant that some sort of criminal act was an essen tial predicate for impeachment, this view may have deteriorated over time into little more than a fantasy. History supports the proposition that such a predicate has rarely been necessary and makes the Ford pronouncement all the more real and all the more frightening.
Take, for example, the plight of United States District Judge John Pickering of New Hampshire. In 1803 he was the second of ficeholder to be impeached under the Constitution. The vote was forty-five to eight. The articles of impeachment charge him with drunkenness and profanity on the bench. No criminal conduct was alleged or proven. Indeed, his son argued he was too ill and so incapable of exercising any sort of judgment as not to be a fit sub ject for impeachment. The Senate voted llineteen to seven to con vict and twenty to six to remove him from office (p. 50). While this would appear to expand the "high crimes and misdemeanors" lan guage of the Constitution beyond all bounds, that is just the beginnin g.
If this sort of activity is truly what the Framers had in mindand few believe it was11 -impeachment of federal judges is no more extraordinary and equally as fragile as the calumny practiced by some city-and state-appointing authorities today. The city-and state-level appointment and reappointment process may depend less on merit and more on some assurance that the judge will follow or has followed the appointing authority's political philosophy. Of course such conduct cannot help but have a chillin g effect on judi cial independence. The author suggests that the impeachment and conviction of Judge Pickering may have been aberrational and occurred "because the question of guilt was put in the form of asking senators whether the judge stood guilty as charged, " rather than whether the acts he allegedly committed constituted impeachable offenses. In other words, the Senate's vote to convict may not reflect an acknowl edgement by the Senate that violations of impeachable offenses were actually involved. from the Republican majority (p. 51), it provides cold comfort for those who maintain that for judicial independence to thrive, party labels must be discarded following election or appointment.
Another area of concern and exploration by Professor Gerhardt is the recent trend toward impeachment by committee. This ap proach lacks, at least at the outset, involvement by the whole Sen ate. Some agree, with at least superficial merit, that this is another constitutionally infirm approach but it is within the Rules of Proce dure & Practice promulgated by the Senate. The infirmity, as the author points out, is that language in the Constitution which dic tates that an impeachment trial be broughr-before the whole Senate (pp. 116-17).
Central to the Senate's adoption in the 1980's of a committee system for impeachment proceedings is the ever-increasing business of the Senate and the time impeachment trials take away from that business. This also accounts for the decreasing attendance by Sena tors at such trials (pp. 34-35). Of course, there are other concerns that have contributed to the decreased number of trials; they in clude the ever-changing complexion of Congress with the attendant frequent leadership changes. These changes, if they find the oppo sition in power and the public official allied with them politically, may result in a slowing of the process. The new approach designat ing twelve senators as a special trial committee to hear and report, utilized in connection with the three impeachment trials in the 1980's, obviates all these problems to a greater or lesser extent. This approach is as follows:
The committee prepares a transcript of the entire hearings before it, a neutral statement of the facts, and a summ ary of the evidence that the parties have introduced on the contested issues of fact. Neither the transcript nor the summary contains any recommendation from the trial committee as to the impeached official's guilt or innocence. [p. 34] Interestingly, one or more of those three impeachment proceed ings followed a criminal trial, a conviction· and an affirmance by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Assuming that Congress uses its power in accordance with its Constitutional mandate or what appears to be its Constitutional mandate, i.e., impeachment for "high crimes and misdemeanors," awaiting the outcome of criminal charges makes the committee approach even more reasonable. This is so because once proof beyond a reasonable doubt has been estab lished it is less important that such proof be provided first hand to 100 senators. While testimony is taken before less than the full Sen ate, the transcript is made available to all Senators. Should it reach the stage where the Senate votes on the articles or charges, the full Senate participates.
THE WAGES OF IMPEACHMENT
We might ask what happens to those who are impeached and found guilty by the Senate. Professor Gerhardt points out at least one fact that has garnered far less attention than it deserves: that the Senate has the opportunity not only to convict or acquit but also upon conviction to disqualify the civil officer from ever holding fu ture public office. While this seems perfectly reasonable, the fact is that it does not always happen. Perhaps because it requires two separate and distinct votes by the Senate. From time to time, there have been impeachments without disqualification and the im peached officeholder remains competent to occupy yet another po sition of public trust. An example of this failure to act by the Senate resulted in the impeachment a decade ago, and the subse quent election to Congress in 1992 of Judge Alcee Hastings.
Although impeached for bribe-taking, he is now at work as an influ ential Congressman, having been elected every two years thereafter (pp. 60-61).
The book is filled with other allied revelations. Another con cern regarding punishment is the result of incomplete impeachment proceedings -a point worth recounting, especially in light of our avowedly budget-conscious Congress. Fa iling initiation (to say nothing of completion) of impeachment proceedings, an office holder may -even after a felony convictiion and exhaustion of all appeals -continue to draw his or her full salary and all attendant raises, COLAs, etc. There may be, according to the author, incar cerated Article III judges who continued to draw full pay due to unfinished impeachment proceedings (p. 172).
CONCLUSION
Many of those who take the time to read this book will regard it as simply providing a valuable analysis of the way the Framers ap proached the impeachment process, how it was employed over the last 200 years, and the more recent changes in procedure. For some federal judges, and to an extent some state judges, it says much more. For those who believe there is a world of difference between appropriately protected criticism of a judicial decision and a threat by Congress or the President to initiate impeachment proceedings against the judge who wrote it, this volume shrinks that world.
In a very real way, although not likely uppermost in the author's mind, Impeachment provides a glimpse into the fragility of our form of government. At least from my vantage point as a federal judge, it suggests that of the three equal branches of government, one, the judicial branch, may be less equal than the others. Put another way, if judicial independence is to remain a mainstay of our form of gov ernment, it will require constant vigilance.
